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In this paper we re-examine the German dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess whether
the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with EMU had been significant. We
use Granger-causality tests between the interest rates of Germany and all the countries
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I. Introduction
Beginning on January 1st 1999, when a common currency, the euro, was
adopted, and the European Central Bank started its operations, 12 European
countries formed a monetary union (the Economic and Monetary Union,
* We are very grateful to Vicente Esteve, Simón Sosvilla-Rivero, and the co-editor of the
Journal, Jorge Streb, for helpful comments and advice on a previous version. The usual
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EMU). More recently, EMU can be said to be fully in force, once the euro
began to circulate and replaced the old national currencies after January 1st
2002.
As it becomes obvious, EMU means the loss of monetary independence
of the participating countries, which might be seen as a cost, at least at first
sight. Things are not so simple, however. It is well known that, according to
the so-called “inconsistent trinity” principle, a fixed exchange rate, full capital
mobility, and the independence of monetary policy are not mutually
compatible. And this situation roughly applied to the European economies
before EMU, which shared a quasi-fixed exchange rate system (the European
Monetary System, EMS), especially so following the elimination of capital
controls after the Single European Act in 1990-92. This fact led to the countries
participating in the EMS to realize that they were gradually losing the control
of their monetary policies in favor of the Bundesbank, the central bank of
Germany, i.e., the country presumed to act as a leader in the EMS. Hence,
EMU could emerge as an economic response to that situation, allowing those
countries to regain some control over monetary policy thanks to the creation
of an European Central Bank, in which they could have a vote (Wyplosz,
1997).
The possible dominant role of Germany within the EMS, prior to the start
of EMU, will be the subject of this paper. This could be of interest in order to
assess whether the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with
EMU has been significant; which, in turn, could be taken as an argument in
favor of EMU itself. The empirical methodology makes use of Granger-
causality tests between the monthly interest rates of Germany and all the
countries participating at any time in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of
the EMS, with the sample period running until December 1998.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief review of the previous
literature on the subject, together with the contributions of the paper, is
provided in Section II. The econometric methodology and empirical results
are discussed in Section III. Finally, the main conclusions are presented in
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II. Review of the Literature
In general terms, prior to EMU a broad consensus emerged in Europe
which would justify the argument that the EMS had worked in an asymmetric
way, with Germany assuming the leading role and the remaining countries
passively adjusting to German monetary policy actions. In turn, these countries
would have benefited from behaving in such a way, since they would have
taken advantage of the firmly established anti-inflation credibility of the
Bundesbank (see, e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; or Mélitz, 1988). This
discussion ultimately lies in the so-called n - 1 problem faced by fixed exchange
rate systems, since there are only n - 1 exchange rates among the n countries
participating in an exchange rate agreement. Therefore, in such a situation,
either one country becomes the leader and sets monetary policy independently
(with the other countries following it), or all countries are allowed to decide
jointly over the implementation of monetary policy (De Grauwe, 2000).
The first empirical studies on the subject seemed to confirm the hypothesis
of German dominance into the EMS (see, e.g., Giavazzi and Giovannini,
1987, 1989, or Karfakis and Moschos, 1990). However, these conclusions
were not confirmed in further research, most of it consisting of tests for
Granger-causality between German and other countries’ interest rates at a
monthly or quarterly frequency (see, among others, Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989;
von Hagen and Fratianni, 1990; Koedijk and Kool, 1992; Katsimbris and
Miller, 1993; or Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis, 1999). In this way, a milder
support for the hypothesis was found in the above quoted papers; namely,
that the other countries’ interest rates depended on the German ones, but also
conversely, even though in a lower extent in terms of both size and persistence.
Finally, some results along these lines were also reported in other studies
using high frequency (i.e., daily) data on interest rates (see Gardner and
Perraudin, 1993; Henry and Weidmann, 1995; and Bajo, Sosvilla and
Fernández, 2001), so that it might seem that Germany would have played a
special role in the EMS, although calling it “dominance” would be too strong.
As stated in the Introduction, in this paper we re-examine the German188 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess whether the loss of monetary
autonomy in Europe associated with EMU has been significant. The paper
contributes to the existing literature in the following respects:
a. The sample period covers until just the eve of EMU, i.e., December 1998.
This allows us to include the most recent events in European monetary
history, such as the German reunification, the monetary turmoil at the end
of 1992, the broadening of the EMS fluctuation bands in August 1993,
and the rather quiet period leading to the birth of EMU. Regarding previous
studies on the subject, those with a more recent sample period are Hassapis,
Pittis and Prodromidis (1999), who use quarterly data until the end of
1994, and Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (2001), who use daily data until
February 1997.
b. The analysis is extended to all the countries participating at any time in
the ERM of the EMS. So, unlike previous studies (with the only exception
of Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández, 2001), that consider only the founding
members of the EMS (i.e., Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland), our analysis also includes those
countries which later joined the ERM of the EMS (i.e., Spain, the UK,
and Portugal).
c. Granger-causality in a cointegration setting is properly tested. That is, an
error-correction mechanism (ECM) is included into every equation to be
estimated when cointegration is found, which allows us to distinguish
between short-run and long-run Granger-causality.1 Also, and following
Katsimbris and Miller’s (1993) suggestion, Granger-causality relationships
between German and the other countries’ interest rates have been
investigated both in a bivariate and a trivariate setting, in order to avoid
possible spurious results due to the omission of some relevant variable. As
usual, the US interest rates is the additional variable added to the analysis.
1 Katsimbris and Miller (1993) were the first to notice this point, usually overlooked in the
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d. Finally, and given the importance of the choice of lag lengths in Granger-
causality tests, these have been selected by means of an appropriate method.
In particular, we have used Hsiao’s (1981) sequential approach, specifically
designed to avoid imposing often false or spurious restrictions on the model.
Notice that, unlike the VAR approach performed in other studies (i.e.,
Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis, 1999), our procedure implies that, for
any pair of variables tested for Granger-causality between them, the number
of lags of the right-hand side variables is not constrained to be the same.
III. Econometric Methodology and Empirical Results
The econometric methodology used in this paper is based on Granger-
causality tests (Granger, 1969). As is well known, the results from these tests
are highly sensitive to the order of lags in the autoregressive process. In this
paper, we will identify the order of lags for each variable by means of Hsiao’s
(1981) sequential approach, which is based on Granger’s concept of causality
and Akaike’s final prediction error criterion.
Suppose we have two stationary variables, Xt and Yt, which we would like
to test for Granger-causality. Consider the models:
The following steps are then used to apply Hsiao’s procedure:
i. Take Xt to be a univariate autoregressive process as in (1), and compute its
final prediction error (FPE hereafter) with the order of lags i varying from
1 to M. Choose the lag that yields the smallest FPE, say m, and denote the
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0).
ii. Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m lags, add lags of Yt to (1) as in (2),
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and compute the FPEs with the order of lags j varying from 1 to N. Choose
the lag that yields the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the corresponding
FPE as FPEX (m, n).
iii. Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m, n). If FPEX (m, 0) > FPEX (m, n), then
Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt, whereas if FPEX (m, 0) < FPEX (m, n), then
Xt would not be Granger-caused by Yt.
Finally, steps (i) - (iii) should be repeated with Yt as the dependent variable
in order to test whether or not Xt Granger-causes Yt.
Recall the earlier assumption that Xt and Yt were stationary variables.
However, if they are integrated of order one (i.e., first-difference stationary),
I(1), and are cointegrated, (1) and (2) need to be amended to:
where zt is the ECM (Engle and Granger, 1987). Notice that if Xt and Yt are
I(1) but are not cointegrated, the coefficient d in (3) and (4) would be equal to
zero.
Now, the previous definitions of Granger-causality for stationary variables
can be applied to the case of I(1) variables from (3) and (4). In particular, if
FPEDX  (m, 0) > FPEDX (m, n), Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt in the short run;
and if d is significantly different from zero, Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt in
the long run. Conversely, if FPEDX (m, 0) < FPEDX (m, n), Xt would not be
Granger-caused by Yt in the short run; and if d is not significantly different
from zero, Xt would not be Granger-caused by Yt in the long run. As before,
the procedure should be repeated with DYt as the dependent variable so that
the hypothesis of short-run and long-run Granger-causality from Xt to Yt can
be tested.
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The data used in this paper are the three-month interbank onshore interest
rates, at a monthly frequency, of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, the UK, Portugal, and the US. The
previous list includes all the European countries participating at any time in
the ERM of the EMS, and coincides with that of the countries joining EMU
from the outset, with the exceptions of Denmark and the UK, and the inclusion
of Luxembourg, Austria and Finland.2 The beginning of the sample period is
March 1979 (i.e., when the ERM started to operate) for the founding members
of the EMS (France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland),
and the month of accession to the ERM for the newcomers: June 1989 for
Spain, October 1990 for the UK, and April 1992 for Portugal, with the data
for Germany and the US adjusting accordingly in each case. The end of the
sample is in all cases December 1998 (i.e., the last month before the starting
of EMU), and all the data come from the Boletín Estadístico (Statistical
Bulletin) of the Bank of Spain.
As a first step of the analysis, we tested for the order of integration of the
variables by means of two alternative tests. On the one hand, the Phillips-
Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 1988), which corrects, in a non-parametric
way, the possible presence of autocorrelation in the standard Dickey-Fuller
test, under the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root. And, on the
other hand, given the small power of this test under certain stochastic properties
of the series, the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992),
for which the null hypothesis is that of stationarity, unlike the standard Dickey-
Fuller-type tests. According to the results shown in parts A and B of  Table 1,
for the Phillips-Perron test the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected
in all cases, at the same time that the null of a second unit root was always
rejected; in turn, for the KPSS test, the null hypothesis of stationarity was
always rejected.
2 Notice that Luxembourg, a founding member of the EMS, is not included in the sample
since she already formed a monetary union with Belgium before EMU. Also, Austria and
Finland, who participated in the ERM of the EMS since January 1995 and October 1996,
respectively, are not included given the small number of observations available.192 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Next, we tested for cointegration between the German interest rate and the
interest rates of the other European countries in our sample, both in a bivariate
and trivariate setting, in the latter case including the US interest rate as an
additional variable. To this end, we made use of Shin’s (1994) approach, which
is based on the application of the KPSS test on the residuals from the (bivariate
or trivariate) cointegrating regressions estimated by the method proposed by
Stock and Watson (1993). This method consists of estimating a dynamic long-
run regression that includes leads and lags of the first differences of the
explanatory variables, and provides a robust correction to the possible presence
of endogeneity among these variables, as well as of serial correlation of the
estimated errors.
Table 1.A. Unit Root Tests. Phillips-Perron Test
Levels First Differences
Z(ta ~ ) Z(ta*) Z( a ˆ t ) Z(ta ~ ) Z(ta*) Z( a ˆ t )
Germany -2.07 -1.26 -0.59 -11.29a -11.23a -11.23a
Belgium -3.52c -1.09 -0.81 -12.78a -12.72a -12.71a
Denmark -2.68 -1.05 -1.19 -10.52a -10.51a -10.48a
Spain -2.47 -0.05 -2.15b -8.87a -8.86a -8.32a
France -3.59b -1.03 -0.73 -11.39a -11.29a -11.28a
Netherlands -2.09 -1.29 -0.95 -12.88a -12.86a -12.85a
Ireland -3.13 -1.61 -1.21 -12.40a -12.39a -12.36a
Italy -3.19 -0.39 -0.82 -12.39a -12.22a -12.19a
Portugal -3.12 -1.07 -2.61a -7.71a -7.69a -7.28a
UK -2.18 -3.24b -2.75a -5.47a -5.27a -5.05a
US -3.23 -1.85 -1.12 -10.86a -10.86a -10.85a
Notes: Z( a ~ t ), Z(ta*) and Z( a ˆ t ) are the Phillips-Perron statistics with drift and trend, with
drift, and without drift, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991).
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Notes: hm, and ht are the KPSS statistics with trend, and without trend, respectively. (a),
(b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical
values are taken from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
Country
The results of the cointegration test appear in Table 2. Recall that the null
hypothesis in the Shin test is that of cointegration instead of no cointegration,
unlike other more standard tests. As can be seen, the only interest rates
appearing to be cointegrated with the German ones, both in the bivariate and
the trivariate case (i.e., when the US interest rates are included into the
cointegration equation), would be those of Spain and the UK; even though in
the case of Portugal cointegration would be rejected just at a 10% significance
level. Notice that the data for these three countries cover a remarkably shorter
period as compared to the founding members of the EMS. In this sense, as
Caporale and Pittis (1995) observe, the integration of the financial markets of
the EMS countries would have been a gradual process, leading to a slow194 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
convergence process of interest rates towards the German levels.3Hence, as
long as a greater convergence should have been achieved for the last years of
the sample period, this might help to explain the finding of cointegration just
in the case of the newcomers to the EMS.
3 Some evidence along these lines for the Spanish case can be found in Camarero, Esteve
and Tamarit (1997).











Notes: The test refers to the Cm statistic on the DOLS residuals. (a), (b), and (c) denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are taken from
Shin (1994).
 Now, we are able to perform Granger-causality tests in a cointegration
framework, and the results for the bivariate case are shown in Table 3. German
interest rates appear to Granger-cause all the other EMS interest rates, the
opposite being also true in all cases but that of Ireland. Notice, however, that,
when bilateral Granger-causality is found, the decrease in FPEs is greater
when German interest rates are added to the equations explaining the other
interest rates than in the opposite case. On the other hand, German interest
rates would cause those of Spain and the UK in the long run, but not the other195 WAS THERE MONETARY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE ON THE EVE OF EMU?
way round. These results would suggest that, despite the presence of some
degree of symmetry in the EMS, the influence of Germany on the other EMS
countries would have been greater than the other way round.
Table 3. Granger-Causality Tests: Bivariate Models
FPE FPE ECM Causality FPE FPE ECM Causality
{m, 0} {m, n} X ® G {m, 0} {m, n} G ® X
Belgium 0.099 0.096 --- YES 0.349 0.312 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 12} {5, 0} {5, 5}
Denmark 0.099 0.098 --- YES 0.358 0.338 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 8} {4, 0} {4, 5}
Spain 0.031 0.027 -0.005 YES 0.134 0.105 -0.043b YES
{4, 0} {4, 4} (-0.519) {4, 0} {4, 7} (-2.203)
France 0.099 0.094 --- YES 0.261 0.204 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 10} {6, 0} {6, 6}
Netherlands 0.099 0.096 --- YES 0.097 0.091 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 10} {12, 0}  {12, 5}
Ireland 0.099 0.100 --- NO 0.627 0.615 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 1} {6, 0} {6, 1}
Italy 0.099 0.099 --- YES 0.309 0.300 --- YES
{12, 0} {12, 10} {11, 0} {11, 4}
Portugal 0.030 0.029 --- YES 0.427 0.403 --- YES
{1, 0} {1, 2} {5, 0} {5, 4}
UK 0.029 0.028 -0.030 YES 0.063 0.051 -0.076a YES
{4, 0} {4, 2} (-1.594) {4, 0} {4, 5} (-2.785)
Notes: m and n denote the lags for the dependent variable and the additional regressor,
respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried
has been 12. X and G denote every country in the first column of the table, and Germany,
respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively,
for the t-statistics of the ECMs (in parentheses).
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Next, we turn to the trivariate case in Table 4. Beginning with causality
between German interest rates and those of the other EMS countries, the
results, shown in part A of Table 4, are quite similar to those in Table 3. The
only exception would be that bilateral Granger-causality is now found for
Ireland too; also, the German interest rates do not appear to Granger-cause
the Spanish ones in the long run. Again, the German interest rates add more
explanatory power to the equations explaining the other interest rates than in
the opposite case.
In order to get a more complete picture, we have also tested for Granger-
causality between the US interest rates and those of the EMS countries other
than Germany, as well as between German and US interest rates, with the
results appearing in parts B and C of Table 4, respectively. As can be seen,
the US interest rates would Granger-cause all the other interest rates, other
than those of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK; however, long-run Granger-
causality would appear in the UK case. In turn, the interest rates of all the
EMS countries, with the only exception of Spain, would Granger-cause the
US interest rates in the short run. On the other hand, bilateral short-run
Granger-causality is found between German and US interest rates in most
cases; the exceptions would be when the interest rates of Spain, the UK and
Portugal are included in the regressions, since Granger-causality only appears
from German to US rates in the first two cases, and no Granger-causality is
detected in the latter.
Overall, the results in parts B and C of Table 4 shed some additional light,
and complement those previously obtained in part A of the same table.
Although strongly influenced by the German ones, the interest rates of the
EMS countries would appear involved in a more complex web of
interdependences, as a result of the high degree of capital mobility existing
across the world economy. In particular, they would appear to be mutually
connected to the US interest rates, both directly and indirectly through the
German ones.
Finally, we have also tested for structural change in all the estimated
equations shown in Tables 3 and 4, by means of the Chow test. The dates197 WAS THERE MONETARY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE ON THE EVE OF EMU?
Table 4.A. Granger-Causality Tests: Trivariate Models.
Causality between German and EMS Interest Rates
FPE FPE ECM Causality FPE FPE ECM Causality
[m, p} [m, n, p} X ® G [m, p} [m, n, p} G ® X
Belgium 0.089 0.086 --- YES 0.255 0.229 --- YES
{12, 10} {12, 1, 10} {10, 12} {10, 4, 12}
Denmark 0.089 0.086 --- YES 0.352 0.340 --- YES
{12, 10} {12, 1, 10} {4, 8} {4, 5, 8}
Spain 0.030 0.029 0.022 YES 0.131 0.116 -0.052 YES
{4, 1} {4, 2, 1} (1.327) {4, 1} {4, 7, 1} (-1.465)
France 0.089 0.081 --- YES 0.247 0.211 --- YES
{12, 10} {12, 10, 10} {6, 12} {6, 6, 12}
Netherlands 0.089 0.086 --- YES 0.096 0.092 --- YES
{12, 10} {12, 1, 10} {12, 7} {12, 5, 7}
Ireland 0.089 0.086 --- YES 0.632 0.621 --- YES
{12, 12} {12, 1, 12} {6, 2} {6, 1, 2}
Italy 0.089 0.088 --- YES 0.311 0.299 --- YES
{12, 10} {12, 9, 10} {12, 1} {12, 4, 1}
Portugal 0.031 0.030 --- YES 0.394 0.345 --- YES
{1, 1} {1, 2, 1} {5, 7} {5, 12, 7}
UK 0.031 0.030 -0.028 YES 0.050 0.048 -0.191a YES
{4, 1} {4, 3, 1} (-0.621) {4, 1} {4, 5, 1} (-3.708)
Notes: m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor, and
the US interest rate, respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum
number of lags tried has been 12. X and G denote every country in the first column of the
table, and Germany, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the ECMs (in parentheses).
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Table 4.B. Granger-Causality Tests: Trivariate Models.
Causality between US and EMS Interest Rates
FPE FPE ECM Causality FPE FPE ECM Causality
{m, p} {m, n, p} X ® US {m, p} {m, n, p} US ® X
Belgium 0.481 0.343 --- YES 0.312 0.281 --- YES
{12, 5} {12, 12, 5} {5, 5} {5, 11, 5}
Denmark 0.481 0.418 --- YES 0.338 0.343 --- NO
{12, 5} {12, 3, 5} {4, 5} {4, 1, 5}
Spain 0.030 0.031 0.009 NO 0.107 0.092 -0.055 YES
{1, 1} {1, 1, 1} (0.541) {4, 7} {4, 3, 7} (-1.618)
France 0.481 0.473 --- YES 0.204 0.203 --- YES
{12, 5} {12, 4, 5} {6, 6} {6, 1, 6}
Netherlands 0.481 0.321 --- YES 0.091 0.091 --- YES
{12, 5} {12, 10, 5} {12, 5} {12, 6, 5}
Ireland 0.481 0.393 --- YES 0.615 0.621 --- NO
{12, 5} {12, 11, 5} {6, 1} {6, 2, 1}
Italy 0.481 0.471 --- YES 0.300 0.299 --- YES
{12 , 5} {12, 1, 5} {11, 4} {11, 1, 4}
Portugal 0.025 0.024 --- YES 0.403 0.361 --- YES
{10, 7} {10, 6, 7} {5, 4} {5, 7, 4}
UK 0.032 0.029 0.056 YES 0.044 0.046 -0.172a NO
{1, 1} {1, 2, 1} (1.502) {4, 2} {4, 9, 2} (-3.537)
Notes: m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor, and
the German interest rate, respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum
number of lags tried has been 12. X and US denote every country in the first column of the
table, and the US, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the ECMs (in parentheses).
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Table 4.C. Granger-Causality Tests: Trivariate Models.
Causality between US and German Interest Rates
FPE FPE ECM Causality FPE FPE ECM Causality
{m, p} {m, n, p} G ® US {m, p} {m, n, p} US ® G
Belgium 0.475 0.407 --- YES 0.096 0.086 --- YES
{12, 12}{12, 12, 12} {12, 12}{12, 10, 12}
Denmark 0.428 0.418 --- YES 0.098 0.090 --- YES
{12, 3} {12, 5, 3} {12, 8} {12, 10, 8}
Spain 0.032 0.031 0.009 YES 0.029 0.029 0.016 NO
{1, 1} {1, 1, 1} (0.541) {4, 2} {4, 1, 2} (0.975)
France 0.487 0.484 --- YES 0.094 0.079 --- YES
{12, 1} {12, 5, 1} {12, 10}{12, 12, 10}
Netherlands 0.381 0.320 --- YES 0.096 0.086 --- YES
{12, 5} {12, 10, 5} {12, 10}{12, 12, 10}
Ireland 0.402 0.389 --- YES 0.100 0.090 --- YES
{12, 11} {12, 2, 11} {12, 1} {12, 10, 1}
Italy 0.474 0.471 --- YES 0.097 0.089 --- YES
{12, 1} {11, 4, 1} {12, 10}{12, 10, 10}
Portugal 0.024 0.024 --- NO 0.029 0.030 --- NO
{10, 2} {10, 1, 2} {1, 2} {1, 1, 12}
UK 0.030 0.029 0.056 YES 0.030 0.031 -0.021 NO
{1, 2} {1, 3, 2} (1.502) {4, 1} {4, 1, 1} (-0.554)
Notes: m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor
(Germany or the US), and every country in the first column of the table, respectively,
leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12.
G and US denote Germany and the US, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the ECMs (in parentheses).
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chosen are: November 1990 (the German reunification), September 1992 (the
beginning of the turbulent period affecting the EMS), and August 1993 (the
broadening of the fluctuation bands in the EMS), and the tests are only
performed for the interest rates of the EMS founding members, given the
reduced number of observations available for the newcomers. As can be seen
in Table 5, most of the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of stability. The
most relevant exceptions would be the Danish and French cases, where some
signs of structural change in Granger-causality from Germany would be
detected following the German reunification and the monetary turmoil at the
end of 1992, both in the bivariate and trivariate models; however, the null
hypothesis is rejected in most cases just at a 10% significance level.4
To summarize, bilateral Granger-causality has been found between the
interest rates of Germany and the other countries participating at any time in
the ERM of the EMS (with the only exception of Ireland in the bivariate
case). However, the increase in explanatory power is always greater when
German interest rates are added to the equations explaining the other interest
rates than the other way round. In addition, the EMS countries’ interest rates
would also appear to be mutually connected to the US interest rates, both
directly and indirectly through the German ones. Therefore, our results would
point to a certain “leadership” or special role of Germany within the EMS,
although we could not talk of “dominance” in a strict sense.
To conclude this section, it could be useful to apply to our results the
terminology introduced by Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis (1999). Denoting,
respectively, Germany, the US, and the EMS countries by G, US, and X as in
Table 4, these authors identify, for the trivariate case, four possible versions
of the German dominance hypothesis:
4 Notice that these results might appear somewhat puzzling, given our previous results on
cointegration (see Table 2 above) and the finding in Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (2001)
of a reinforcement of German leadership following the German reunification. Perhaps the
small number of observations available for the second half of the different subsamples
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Table 5. Tests of Structural Change
A. Causality between German and EMS Interest Rates
(Bivariate Models)
X ® G G ® X
1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.5252 0.4756 0.3123 1.1132 1.0152 0.8799
Denmark 1.3472 1.3029 0.5235 1.3876 1.7864c 0.2547
France 0.5022 0.4016 0.3828 1.5967c 1.8587c 1.4990
Netherlands 0.5558 0.4961 0.3222 0.7498 0.5879 0.2816
Ireland 0.3362 0.2346 0.1506 1.5070 1.5177 0.2638
Italy 0.3457 0.3019 0.2628 0.9628 0.4445 1.2499
B. Causality between German and EMS Interest Rates
(Trivariate Models)
X ® G G ® X
1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.3466 0.3181 0.2992 1.1920 1.1150 0.9706
Denmark 0.4071 0.3763 0.2876 1.5338c 1.9298b 0.3422
France 0.7199 0.6993 0.6706 1.4200c 1.9734a 1.1229
Netherlands 0.3303 0.3130 0.2925 0.5400 0.3988 0.2417
Ireland 0.3410 0.3162 0.2948 1.3750 1.6119c 0.2319
Italy 0.3982 0.2810 0.4058 1.0061 1.1471 0.4841
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C. Causality between US and EMS Interest Rates
(Trivariate Models)
X ® US US ® X
1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.7614 0.4571 0.4153 1.1452 1.1778 1.0222
Denmark 1.2914 0.8780 0.6659 1.3542 1.6384c 0.2384
France 1.1509 0.7850 0.4990 1.5068 1.3741 0.7552
Netherlands 0.6850 0.5462 0.5179 0.5464 0.4176 0.2485
Ireland 0.9324 0.5884 0.4063 1.3750 1.6119 0.2319
Italy 1.2955 0.5716 0.4139 1.0061 1.1471 0.4841
D. Causality between US and German Interest Rates
(Trivariate Models)
G ® US US ® G
1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 1.0792 0.6449 0.6312 0.5701 0.6168 0.3963
Denmark 1.2914 0.8780 0.6659 0.9298 0.9003 0.4341
France 0.8817 0.4799 0.4143 0.6514 0.6230 0.6146
Netherlands 0.8018 0.6017 0.6175 0.5851 0.5924 0.3112
Ireland 0.8364 0.6048 0.4118 0.6697 0.4268 0.4100
Italy 1.0824 0.4630 0.3363 0.4374 0.4408 0.2775
Notes:  X , G, and US denote every country in the first column of the tables, Germany and
the US, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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i. Strong (i.e., no direct or indirect causality from US): there is Granger-
causality G ® X, but not US ® X and US ® G.
ii. Weak of type 1 (i.e., direct causality from US): there is Granger-causality
G ® X and US ® X, but not US ® G.
iii. Weak of type 2 (i.e., direct and indirect causality from US): there is Granger-
causality G ® X, US ® X and US ® G.
iv. Semi strong (i.e., only indirect causality from US through Germany): there
is Granger-causality G ® X and US ® G, but not US ® X.
Now, from the last columns of parts A, B and C of Table 4, the following
typology can be established:
· Strong German dominance: the UK.
· Weak German dominance of type 1: Spain, and Portugal.
· Weak German dominance of type 2: Belgium, France, the Netherlands,
and Italy.
· Semi strong German dominance: Denmark, and Ireland.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the German dominance hypothesis,
extending previous findings by other authors to all the countries participating
at any time in the ERM of the EMS, with the sample period covering until
just the eve of EMU, i.e., December 1998. The empirical methodology makes
use of Granger-causality tests between the interest rates of Germany and the
other EMS countries, in a proper cointegration framework where the lag
lengths of the variables have been chosen by means of Hsiao’s sequential
approach in order to avoid misleading inferences arising from inconsistent
model estimates. The tests have been performed in both a bivariate and a
trivariate setting, in this case including the US interest rate as the additional
variable.
Summarizing, our results point to a mutual but asymmetrical relationship204 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
between Germany and the other countries participating at any time in the
ERM of the EMS, since bilateral Granger-causality was found between the
interest rates of Germany and those of the other countries, although the German
interest rates added more to the explanation of the other interest rates than in
the opposite case. Also, a mutual connection between the EMS countries’
and the US interest rates would emerge, both directly and indirectly through
the German rates. Finally, we hardly found evidence of significant structural
changes in the estimated relationships following the German reunification,
the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, and the broadening of the fluctuation
bands in the EMS.
Therefore, our results would support a weak version of the hypothesis of
German dominance during the working of the EMS, since there would have
prevailed a mutual relationship among the monetary policies of all the countries
involved, even though that relationship would have been stronger from
Germany to the other countries than in the opposite way. Then, Germany
would have played a certain “leadership” or special role in the EMS, although
she would not have been strictly the “dominant” player.
Regarding the policy implications of the paper, these would provide some
mild support to the hypothesis about EMU as an economic response to the
loss of monetary autonomy in Europe in favor of Germany, especially after
the achievement of full capital mobility in the first nineties (Wyplosz, 1997).
Also, the position of the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, and Portugal)
faced to EMU does not seem to be too different to that of the “core” European
countries, at least in terms of the autonomy of their monetary policies before
EMU. The same can be said for Denmark and the UK, two countries that
chose not to participate in EMU; in fact, and somewhat ironically, the UK
would have been, according to our results, the country most “dominated” by
German monetary policy actions.
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